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The Shifting Legitimization of Democracy and Elections: 
The Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis
By Joas Wagemakers, Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands
The Arab Spring has caused huge changes in the political 
landscape of various Middle Eastern countries, among 
them Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood briefly held 
power and various Salafi groups participated in elections 
and parliament — which Salafis had stayed away from 
before . Other countries in the Arab world, such as Tunisia 
and Libya, have also seen a greater political assertiveness 
among Islamists since 2011 . This memo deals with the 
Islamist ideas on democracy and participation in elections 
partly underpinning these choices and policies .
Three Different Islamist Positions on Democracy
The main problem with Islamist views of democracy 
— found, for example, in the writings of Abul Ala 
Maududi — is the reconciliation between rule by the 
people (democracy) and rule by God through the sharia 
(theocracy) on the other . Maududi attempted to solve this 
dilemma in his idea of a “theo-democracy” by allowing the 
people to decide within the framework of the sharia, but 
not allowing them to overstep its boundaries . Not only 
did this include structural discrimination against non-
Muslims (the leader could only be a Muslim, for example), 
but it also seemed to dismiss the possibility that one pillar 
of this system (the people) might ever decide against the 
other pillar of the system (God) . This problem still plagues 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis to a certain extent; 
although they have come up with three main ways to deal 
with it .
Subjection of the sharia to the will of the people: Islamic 
law will not be applied until the people accept it . If the 
people are not ready for it yet, the (partial) application of 
the sharia will be put on hold until they are ready . This is 
clearly the most democratic position held among people 
within the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan . I have not 
encountered it, however, among Salafis .
Shura as an Islamic form of democracy: Islamic law must 
be applied and the people have the right to consultation 
(shura), but only about things that are not clear from the 
sharia itself . The power of the people, in this case, is limited 
to issues that do not overstep the boundaries of the sharia, 
as in Maududi’s “theo-democracy .” There is considerable 
disagreement, however, over where these boundaries lie 
exactly, and many also feel that these boundaries should 
be relocated by every new generation . In some form or 
another, this position is held by many members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood . 
A complete rejection of the idea of rule by the people: 
Islamic law is generally quite clear and the people can 
only decide about detailed issues not decided upon 
in the existing legal texts of Islam . Those decisions 
naturally cannot transgress the rules of the sharia . These 
rules cannot be renegotiated throughout time by new 
generations since they are fine as they are — the crucial 
difference from the previous position . The rule of the 
people, in other words, is limited to shura, which cannot 
be equated with democracy . This position is held by the 
more hawkish members of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
many Salafis . This group differs on whether or not to 
participate in a less-than-Islamic system, which has to do 
with elections .
Three Different Islamist Positions on Elections
Before the Arab Spring, Jihadi-Salafis often rejected 
elections in general since elections allow the majority to 
rule, which is fundamentally wrong — “the truth,” not 
whatever the majority feels is right, should simply be 
applied, . Since the Arab Spring, however, several Jihadi-
Salafis, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Basir al-Tartusi 
and Abul Mundhir al-Shinqiti, have indicated that while 
they reject the philosophy of democracy (i .e ., rule by the 
people instead of by God), they do not reject the means 
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of democracy (i .e ., elections, term limits, correcting the 
ruler where necessary, a limited role for the people, etc .) . 
Apart from a complete rejection of election because of 
the aforementioned reason, this has led to three different 
positions among Islamists on elections .
Complete acceptance on both legislative and executive 
levels: This position has long been widely held among 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who believe that 
running for parliament and the presidency are both 
acceptable . Participation in government is also justified in 
their view . Although exceptions exist (e .g ., Hasan al-Turabi, 
attorney general in Sudan), it speaks for itself that most 
Sunni Islamists in the Arab world simply never had the 
chance to participate in elections for president prior to the 
Arab Spring . Some politically minded Salafis have also held 
this view for some time (e .g ., in Lebanon) while others have 
shown that they hold the same position since the Arab 
Spring (e .g ., Hazim Abu Ismail in Egypt) .
Acceptance on legislative level only: Some hawkish 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood (e .g ., Muhammad 
Abu Faris in Jordan) accept running for parliament as a 
legitimate way to influence policy in an Islamist way, while 
refusing to be part of the government and its inevitably 
“un-Islamic” policies . This would be different if there 
were a “genuinely Islamic” government, of course, but 
this has not happened yet . Others (e .g ., quietist Salafi 
scholars like Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his 
followers) do not believe in actively nominating candidates 
for parliament since they believe the time is not yet ripe 
for this, but they do accept supporting and voting for 
“good” Islamist groups if they are a less bad alternative to 
other political parties or if they can limit the influence of 
less desirable MPs . As such, quietist Salafis who hold this 
position have supported the Islamic Salvation Front in 
Algeria and Sunni parties in Bahrain;
Acceptance on executive levels: This is a rare but 
interesting position . It was proposed by the Syrian-
British Jihadi-Salafi scholar Abu Basir al-Tartusi, who 
supported Hazim Abu Ismail, an Egyptian Salafi candidate 
for president . Tartusi stated that one must not become 
involved in “un-Islamic” legislation and should therefore 
shun parliament, but running for president (being a local 
leader subject to an eventual caliphate) was allowed .
Ideological Shifts among Islamists
The (partial) acceptance of democracy among Islamists, 
particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, has been a 
long process that has been influenced mainly by local 
circumstances and international Islamist discourse and is 
unlikely to change drastically after, for example, the coup 
in Egypt . In other words, democratically minded Muslim 
Brotherhood members are unlikely to dismiss democracy 
altogether now that their effort to rule Egypt has been 
thwarted . People who were not too keen on democracy all 
along, however, will likely feel vindicated . Recent events 
in Egypt may also sway some Brothers who were always 
doubtful about democracy’s merits . Not all Islamists’ 
decisions related to democracy are based on such long 
processes, however . Some decisions — like the Salafi Nur 
Party’s participation in the Egyptian elections after the 
fall of Mubarak — may probably be more easily turned 
back because it was not rooted in a decades-long thought 
process but rather in a pragmatic belief that now was the 
chance to go into politics .
This means that Muslim Brothers who are open to 
participation in elections and watered-down forms of 
democracy may be willing to engage in politics even 
further if given the chance to do so . From this position of 
greater political involvement, they may then work on a 
genuine acceptance of democracy, a stance that some of 
their fellow Brothers have already adopted . This could even 
apply to Jihadi-Salafi groups, even though the latter are the 
most adamant in their rejection of democracy . To be sure, 
al Qaeda members are not about to become Jeffersonian 
democrats, but if the Arab world ever becomes open 
enough to allow such groups to express their contention 
through electoral politics and parliament, they might just 
do that . Some might argue that this would undercut al 
Qaeda members’ raison d’être (jihad), but I would argue 
that it is much more a general sense of unease about their 
own regimes and Western influence that fuels such groups . 
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If al Qaeda members realize that these issues be contested 
by other means than fighting and terrorism, they might 
eventually run for parliament too .
Conclusion
What is clear is that the different positions on democracy 
and elections form a continuum: They are not strictly 
separated but merge into each other and can be (and are) 
adopted by both the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis . 
Ideological shifts can be seen in the form of slow but 
genuine movements across positions over a long period 
of time as well as in the form of quick but superficial 
movement across positions when political circumstances 
change, such as after the Arab Spring . The latter can 
accommodate the former, meaning that positions 
can change, even for Jihadi-Salafis . If adherents to the 
ideology of al Qaeda ever decide to continue their fight 
by parliamentary means — unlikely as it seems right now 
— they will find that the justifications for doing so have 
already been thought of and are simply theirs for the taking .
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Rethinking Islamist Politics
By Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Emory University
What is the future of Islamist movement studies? What 
central trends and issues merit closer attention, and what 
are the conceptual and empirical challenges we are likely to 
encounter in our efforts to investigate them? In this memo, 
I offer a few reflections in the hope of contributing to a 
wider discussion .
Let me begin with a point that brooks no disagreement 
here, but which has yet to be fully absorbed by elected 
public officials, the media, and the wider public in the 
United States . And that is that not all Islamists are the 
same . The Islamic movement sector encompasses Sunni 
and Shiite groups, national liberation movements and 
movements primarily oriented toward domestic reform, 
Salafis and non-Salafis, jihadists and non-jihadists, Arabs 
and non-Arabs, and many other vectors of differentiation . 
Such heterogeneity makes any grand generalizations about 
the broader purposes of Islamist groups, as well as their 
internal dynamics, operational strategies, and immediate 
goals, problematic at best and nonsensical at worst .
Going deeper, we find differentiation and complexity 
within Islamist organizations as well . Much of the 
literature on Arab politics has tended to treat the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other Islamist groups as unitary 
players in a multi-actor field encompassing the regime, 
the military, and other organized civilian groups . The 
focus has typically been on how the agendas and tactical 
choices of Islamist groups are shaped by the wider 
political environment in which they are embedded, 
tracking, for example, how they have responded to the 
different institutional cues associated with state policies of 
